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ABSTRACT
The problem of sovereign indebtedness is becoming a worldwide crisis
because nations, unlike individuals and corporations, lack access to
bankruptcy laws to restructure unsustainable debt. Decades of international
efforts to solve this problem through contracting and attempted treaty-
making have failed to provide an adequate debt-restructuring framework. A
significant amount of outstanding sovereign debt is governed, however, by
English law. This Article argues that the U.K. Parliament has the
extraordinary power to help solve the problem of unsustainable country debt
by changing English law to facilitate fair and consensual debt restructuring.
This Article also proposes modifications to English law that Parliament
could consider, based on a model law for sovereign debt restructuring.1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many countries—including Greece, Argentina, Ukraine,
and perhaps now Venezuela2—have found themselves indebted beyond their
ability to pay. The threat of default can harm not only debtor nations and their
citizens, but also their creditors.3 An actual default can jeopardize the very
stability of the financial system.4
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1. Portions of this Article are based in part on Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 343 (2016) [hereinafter A
Model-Law Approach].
2. Cf. Dimitra DeFotis, Venezuela Debt Deadlines: Will Oil Cover February?, BARRON’S
EMERGING MARKETS DAILY (Feb. 3, 2017, 12:26 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/emergingmar
ketsdaily/2017/02/03/venezuela-debt-deadlines-will-oil-cover-february/ (reporting that “[t]he
government of Venezuela and state-controlled oil company Petroleos de Venezuela together face
$10 billion in debt payments” in 2017, and that April deadlines “could prove especially onerous”).
3. Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IPD-CIGI-
CGEG Policy Brief from the November 17, 2014 Conference on “Frameworks for Sovereign Debt
Restructuring” held at Columbia University, at 1 (“Poorly designed arrangements for resolving
sovereign debt problems can lead to inefficiencies and inequities . . . . Delays in restructuring can
be very costly. Insufficiently deep restructuring can force the economy through multiple crises and
restructuring—at a high cost.”).
4. See, e.g., Jay L. Westbrook, Sovereign Debt and Exclusions from Insolvency Proceedings,
in ADEBT RESTRUCTURINGMECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGNS: DOWENEED A LEGAL PROCEDURE?
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The problem of unsustainable sovereign debt is especially serious
because international law—unlike domestic bankruptcy law for companies
and individuals—does not yet facilitate reasonable debt restructuring.
Sovereign debt restructuring has therefore been limited to contractual
negotiation, raising the holdout problem.5 This is a type of collective action
problem in which one or more creditors refuse to agree to a debt restructuring
plan that proposes to change critical payment terms—such as principal
amount, interest rate, and maturities, which may require unanimity to
change—in order to extract more than their fair share of a debt-restructuring
settlement.6
Some sovereign debt contracts—including bond contracts governed by
English law7—include provisions called collective action clauses (CACs),
that attempt to mitigate the holdout problem by enabling a specified
supermajority, such as two-thirds or three-quarters, of the contracting parties
to change critical repayment terms.8 Relying solely on such a contractual
approach, however, has been insufficient.9 Even in sovereign debt contracts
that include CACs,10 holdouts may be able to purchase vote-blocking
positions.11 More critically, a CAC ordinarily binds only the parties to the
251 (Christoph Paulus, ed. 2014); cf. E-mail from Eva Hüpkes, Adviser on Regulatory Policy and
Cooperation at the Financial Stability Board (FSB), to the author (Apr. 29, 2015) (on file with
author) (observing that “doubts about the ability of states to provide additional resources can make
financial institutions more fragile, in particular where there are no regimes in place that provide
authorities with powers and tools to resolve financial firms without use of public funds”).
Sometimes a pre-default scenario can be de-stabilizing if, for example, it threatens debt securities
that are widely held by financial institutions, motivating panicked sales that drive down prices.
5. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 960 (2000) [hereinafter Sovereign Debt Restructuring].
6. Id. at 959–60. Economists regard this as a form of “rent-seeking” behavior. Kenneth M.
Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention
4 (IMF Working Paper No. 03/134, 2003). Recent empirical research shows “a drastic rise of
sovereign debt litigation” by holdout creditors. Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, & Henrik
Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court (May 6, 2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189
997. That research also suggests “that creditor litigation is increasingly common and costly for
defaulting sovereigns.” Id. at 1.
7. See, e.g., IMF, STRENGTHENING THE CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 17 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf (stating that “CACs allowing for
collectively-binding restructuring decisions have traditionally been included in sovereign bonds
governed by English . . . Japanese law”).
8. SeeWestbrook, supra note 4, at 255.
9. Cf. Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, in ADEBTRESTRUCTURING
MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGNS: DO WE NEED A LEGAL PROCEDURE? 262 (Christoph Paulus ed.
2014) (characterizing sole reliance on a contractual approach as “deeply dysfunctional and
produce[ing] bad law”).
10. Many sovereign debt contracts simply lack CACs. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt:
The Statutory Solution, 33 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 38 (2015) [hereinafter The Statutory Solution]; cf.
infra text accompanying note 69 (observing that even after years of trying to include CACs,
relatively few Greek debt agreements actually contained such clauses).
11. See, e.g., John A.E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: International
Certification Boards for Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1, 4 (Law & EconomicsWorking Paper No.
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particular contract that includes it;12 hence, the parties to any given sovereign
debt contract can act as holdouts in a debt restructuring plan that requires
parties to all such contracts to agree to the plan.13 This explains the recent
inability to restructure English-law governed Greek bonds that contained
CACs.14
In attempting to address this cross-contract holdout problem, the
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) has proposed CACs that
also aggregate voting across debt issues.15 But aggregate-voting CACs have
some of the same limitations as other CACs, notably binding only creditors
who are parties to agreements that include them.16 More importantly, even if
all new sovereign debt contracts were to include aggregate-voting CACs, it
will be many years before existing debt contracts, which do not include them,
are paid off.17
CACs are therefore an inadequate substitute for pursuing a more
systematic legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring.18 However, a
multilateral framework, such as a convention or treaty, is not currently
politically feasible. In 2014, for example, the United Nations General
Assembly voted to begin work on a “multilateral legal framework” for
81, 2013), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/81 (vulture funds “may easily be able
to marshal blocking positions, especially when a sovereign has issued multiple rounds of debt”); cf.
John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina and Solutions to
the Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102. CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1707 (2014) (illustrating how
holdouts can “bid up the price of defaulted bonds in order to achieve a blocking position”); Molly
Ryan, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Why Now and Why Not in the IMF, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2473, 2502
(2014) (stating that “Greek bonds governed by U.K. law restructured in 2012 contained a CAC, but
holdout investors successfully purchased blocking minorities in individual bond series that could
not be offset by pro-restructuring majorities”). The higher the voting requirement (e.g., three-
quarters), the easier it is to block the requisite vote.
12. Cf. IMF, supra note 7, at 18 (observing that “most existing CACs operate on a series-by-
series basis”).
13. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 960.
14. IMF, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that of “the 36 [Greek] bond issuances governed by English
law that were eligible to participate in the debt exchange, and which contained CACs, only 17 were
successfully restructured using the CACs. The operation of the CACs in the remaining bond issues
was effectively neutralized by holdout creditors . . . .”).
15. See INT’LCAPITALMKT. ASS’N, STANDARDAGGREGATEDCOLLECTIVEACTIONCLAUSES
(“CACS”) FOR THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES 3 (Aug. 2014). The IMF and
the G20 have supported the effort to include these aggregate-voting CACs in sovereign debt
contracts.
16. Cf. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 2 (observing that ICMA’s CAC aggregate-voting clauses
“are improvements over the old terms, but are not sufficient to solve a variety of problems faced in
sovereign debt restructurings”).
17. See, e.g., IMF, supra note 7, at 33–34 (observing that approximately 29% of all sovereign
bonds outstanding, and 21.2% of all such bonds governed by English law, “will mature after ten
years”).
18. For a systematic comparison of contractual and statutory legal resolution frameworks, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 95 (2012) [hereinafter Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options].
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sovereign debt restructuring.19 The resolution—originally promoted by
Argentina, apparently in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to let
stand a lower court ruling enforcing pari passu clauses in Argentine sovereign
debt—was introduced by Bolivia on behalf of the group of seventy-seven
developing nations (of which Bolivia was then the chair) and China.20 But
both the United States21 and the European Union22 opposed the resolution, to
some extent paralleling opposition to an earlier International Monetary Fund
(IMF) proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)
convention.23 Although the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) has been tasked with moving the General
Assembly’s approach forward, there is skepticism as to whether any such
framework is feasible without U.S. and EU support.24
This Article proposes an inventive, and potentially more effective,
approach to achieving a sovereign-debt-restructuring framework by focusing
on the governing law. Most sovereign debt contracts are governed either by
the debtor-state’s law or by New York or English law.25 For contracts
governed by the debtor-state’s law, that nation itself could enact law to
facilitate its debt restructuring.26 For contracts governed by New York law, I
have elsewhere examined in depth how that state could enact law to facilitate
sovereign debt restructuring.27 This Article examines how English law could
19. See Press Release, General Assembly, Proposal for Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Framework among 6 Draft Texts Approved by Second Committee, U.N. Press Release GA/EF/3417
(Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release 3417].
20. For a current status, see id.
21. Id. (“Also speaking before the vote, the representative of the United States was obliged to
vote ‘no’ on the draft resolution as there was ongoing work on the technically complex issue in such
bodies as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were more appropriate venues.”).
22. Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stated that the IMF is the “primary forum
to discuss sovereign debt restructuring.” Id. Apparently few, if any, developed-economy countries
supported the resolution, although many abstained rather than vote no. See Recorded Vote at 37th
Meeting, Dec. 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/second/69/modalities.pdf.
23. Cf. A Model-Law Approach, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing U.S. opposition to the IMF’s
proposed SDRM). It appears that at least part of that opposition was due to lobbying by major
financial industry associations. Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure
Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’LL. 299, 391–93 (2005). I later compare that opposition to potential
opposition to this essay’s proposed model-law approach. See infra notes 133–143 and
accompanying text. The opposition to the IMF’s proposed SDRM is especially ironic in light of
Italy’s comment. See U.N. Press Release 3417, supra note 19.
24. A Model-Law Approach, supra note 1, at 353.
25. See, e.g., Philip R. Wood, Governing Law of Financial Contracts Generally, in CONFLICT
OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 12 (ed. 2007); Brad Setser, IPD Task Force on Sovereign
Debt brief, The Political Economy of the SDRM 16 (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/content/pu
blications/attachments/Setser_IPD_Debt_SDRM.pdf (observing that “[a]lmost all international
bonds are now governed by New York law, English law, and to a lesser extent Japanese law”).
26. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 1034; see also Peter S. Smedresman et
al., Governing Law in Sovereign Debt—Lessons from the Greek Crisis and Argentina Dispute of
2012 (New York City Bar, Comm. on Foreign and Comparative Law, Working Paper, 2013),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072390-GoverningLawinSovereignDebt.pdf
[hereinafter Governing Law in Sovereign Debt].
27. A Model-Law Approach, supra note 1, at 353–54.
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be modified to facilitate the restructuring of sovereign debt contracts
governed by that law.
To that end, Part I of the Article proposes modifications to English law
based on a model law for sovereign debt restructuring (hereinafter “Model
Law”). Part I also distinguishes this approach from a legal treaty or
convention,28 explains how the Model Law provisions could be enacted into
English law, and discusses aspects of those provisions. For example,
although the Model Law provides for prospective application, it includes an
option to be enacted with both prospective and retroactive application.29
Retroactivity would facilitate any needed restructuring of the immense
stock—perhaps a quarter30 to a third31 or more32 of all outstanding sovereign
debt contracts—of such contracts governed by English law.33 Part II analyzes
the legal, economic, and political feasibility of a model-law approach.
Finally, the Article’s Appendix suggests the Model Law’s text.
I. A MODEL LAW TO FACILITATE SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING
A model law is suggested legislation for governments to individually
consider enacting as domestic law in their jurisdictions.34 In contrast, a treaty
or convention—the terms are synonymous—is a multilateral agreement or
28. For a detailed discussion of the history of attempted treaty approaches to sovereign debt
restructuring, see id. at 349–53.
29. See infra Appendix, Model Law art. 1(2).
30. See, e.g., Michael Tomz, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default 8 (Annual
Reviews of Economics, Paper, 2012), http://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzWright2012-
w18598.pdf (finding that around a quarter of sovereign debt contracts are governed by English law
with 28% by value and 22% by number).
31. See, e.g., IMF, supra note 7, at 33 n.45 (finding that about a third of sovereign bonds
outstanding from emerging market economies are issued under English law).
32. See, e.g., id. at 6 (estimating that international sovereign bonds governed by the laws of
England represent approximately 40% of the notional amount of the outstanding stock of
international sovereign bonds). This percentage references “international” sovereign bonds, which
appears to mean sovereign bonds governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than that of the debtor-
state issuing the bonds. Because some percentage of a debtor-state’s bonds tend, in my experience,
to be governed by local law (in which case, the debtor-state itself could change that law to facilitate
its debt restructuring; see supra note 26 and accompanying text), the actual percentage of sovereign
bonds governed by English law is certainly less than 40 percent of all sovereign bonds.
33. Cf. Governing Law in Sovereign Debt, supra note 26 at 8–9 (surveying twenty-three
“relatively recent short and medium term debt offerings by sovereigns” where ten of twenty-three
were governed by English law and nine of twenty-three were governed by New York law); Udaibar
S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou, & Christopher Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-
2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 41 (IMF, WP/12/203, 2012), https://www.imf.or
g/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf (finding that 140 out of 631 issuances were governed by
English law valued at $117 billion out of $411 billion total, second only to New York law).
34. See FAQ – UNCITRAL Texts, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/u
ncitral/en/uncitral_texts_faq.html (last visitedMar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter FAQ - UNCITRAL Texts].
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compact among nations.35 The more relaxed nature of a model-law approach
can be more appealing than a formal treaty.36
In the case of sovereign debt restructuring, for example, a model-law
approach could bypass the current political impasse to achieve a treaty.37 A
model-law approach could also be pursued in parallel as part of an overall
strategy for developing a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt
restructuring, helping “to develop consensus around [debt restructuring]
ideas that are commercially sound and legally effective.”38
A. ENACTING THEMODEL LAW INTO ENGLISH LAW
English law refers to the law governing England and Wales, which are
semi-autonomous subnational regions within the United Kingdom.39
Statutory changes to English law are made by the U.K. Parliament
(Parliament).
Parliament would enact the Model Law in the same way it legislates any
other bill, a process that normally involves four stages.40 The first stage is a
draft bill incorporating the provisions of the Model Law to be proposed for
consultation by a government department and issued to interested parties or
to select committees in the House of Commons or House of Lords.41 After
approval by the applicable select committee, the second stage involves the
bill being presented for debate before Parliament, as a proposal for a new
law.42 In the third stage, the bill must be approved by a majority of both the
House of Commons and the House of Lords.43 If the bill receives that
35. See Convention, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“An agreement or compact,
especially one among nations; a multilateral treaty”); see also FAQ – UNCITRAL Texts, supra note
34 (defining a convention as “an instrument that is binding under international law on States and
other entities with treaty-making capacity that choose to become a party to that instrument”).
36. See, e.g., John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 984–86 (2005) [hereinafter Procedural Incrementalism]
(discussing possible explanations for the recent success of model laws).
37. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
38. Oonagh Fitzgerald, Next Steps Towards a Multilateral Debt Workout Process, Part 2, CIGI
GLOBAL RULE OF LAW BLOG 3–4 (June 4, 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/next-steps-
towards-multilateral-debt-workout-process-part-2.
39. See, e.g., Tom Bolam, Fladgate LLP, Common Mistakes in Choice of Law and Jurisdiction
Clauses, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8f9476e8-
b712-4726-b675-21463a3355e9 (explaining that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland has three separate and distinct legal systems—Scotland; England and Wales; and Northern
Ireland—and that English Law refers to the legal system of England and Wales).
40. See, e.g., Making Laws, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Making Laws]; see also Legislative Process: Taking a Bill
Through Parliament, U.K.GOVERNMENT (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/legislative
-process-taking-a-bill-through-parliament.
41. See Making Laws, supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. Id. In each house, the bill must pass through a first reading, second reading, committee stage,
report stage, and third reading with votes and amendments at each stage. Under certain conditions,
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approval, the fourth and final stage is to send the bill to the monarch for Royal
Assent—which, unlike in the United States where the president holds an oft-
used veto power, is regarded as more of a formality.44 After Royal Assent,
the bill becomes an Act of Parliament, creating binding law.45
B. KEY PROVISIONS OF THEMODEL LAW
The Model Law is designed to facilitate the restructuring of
unsustainable sovereign debt contracts that are governed by English law. This
section next explains certain aspects of the Model Law’s key provisions.
Rationale. The Preamble explains the reasons for the Model Law. The
ultimate goals are to restore the debtor-state to debt sustainability, so as to
relieve the undue economic burden on the debtor-state’s citizens; to enable
the debtor-state to pay its debts, thereby avoiding a default that might have
systemic economic consequences; to reduce creditor uncertainty, thereby
reducing lending costs; and to reduce the need for costly and morally
hazardous debt bailouts.
Optional Retroactivity. If and when enacted into English law, the Model
Law would apply to future sovereign debt contracts that are governed by
English law. As an option, Article 1(2) allows the Model Law to also apply
retroactively;46 this provides a unique opportunity. As observed, numerous
and rarely used, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 allow the House of Commons to pass a bill
without the consent of the House of Lords. Id.
44. Id. Although the monarch ordinarily gives Assent to a bill that has been duly approved by
both Houses, there appears to be no constitutional mechanism by which to require that Assent to be
given. E-mail from Riz Mokal, Barrister, South Square Chambers, & Honorary Professor,
University College London Faculty of Laws, to the author (Apr. 3, 2017) (on file with author).
45. See Making Laws, supra note 40.
46. The term “retrospectively” is sometimes used as a synonym for retroactivity under English
law. See, e.g., Geoffrey T. Loomer, Taxing Out of Time: Parliamentary Supremacy and Retroactive
Tax Legislation 1 BRITISH TAX REV. 64, 65 (2006).
[T]here has been some confusion in the jurisprudence regarding the use of the terms
‘retroactive’ and ‘retrospective’ . . . . [I]n the context of legislation, each term is defined
as a synonym of the other: a law is considered retroactive/retrospective where it is made
operative at a past time. Different jurisdictions have, historically, favoured one term over
the other.
Id. Even if the terms were synonymous, this Article uses the term “retroactive” because it has a
clearer meaning internationally. Furthermore, there may well be a subtle difference in meaning
between the terms. Cf. Benner v. Canada, 1997 S.C.R. 358 at para. 39 (adopting a distinction made
in Elmer Driedger, Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective Reflections, 56 CAN. BARREV. 264, 268–69
(1978)).
A retroactive statute is one that operates as of a time prior to its enactment. A
retrospective statute is one that operates for the future only. It is prospective, but it
imposes new results in respect of a past event. A retroactive statute operates backwards.
A retrospective statute operates forwards, but it looks backwards in that it attaches new
consequences for the future to an event that took place before the statute was enacted.
Id.
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sovereign debt contracts are currently governed by English law.47Retroactive
application would enable the Model Law to resolve problems of
unsustainable sovereign debt that arise under those contracts.
Some might criticize retroactive application of the Model Law as
impairing sanctity of contract. I later analyze the legal and normative
consequences of choosing the optional retroactivity.48
Claims Covered. Article 2(2) broadly defines the types of debt claims
that the Model Law covers. Notably, its coverage is not limited to bond debt
or other debt instruments traded as securities. The Model Law covers all
payment claims against a debtor-state for monies borrowed or for the debtor-
state’s guarantee of (or other contingent obligation on) monies borrowed.
Unlike the IMF’s proposed SDRM, which covered only long-term-
maturity claims (of the types of claims it otherwise covered), the Model Law
does not discriminate between, and thus covers both, long-term and short-
term maturities. Covering both recognizes that, increasingly, most sovereign
debt “bailouts have come in response to the [rollover] of short-term claims.”49
Covering this important cause of a debtor-state’s inability to pay will help to
facilitate necessary debt relief while also reducing short-term-lender moral
hazard; short-term lenders can no longer assume that their claims against a
financially troubled debtor-state will be paid in full. That, in turn, will reduce
short-term sovereign lending and thereby reduce rollover risk—in this
context, the risk that a debtor-state will be unable to borrow sufficient new
funds to repay maturing short-term debt.50 The head of the sovereign debt
restructuring practice at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP has called
rollover risk one of today’s most critical sovereign debt problems.51
Article 2(2) also broadly defines “monies borrowed” to include a wide
range of financing, other than trade accounts payable arising in the ordinary
course of business. The Model Law’s coverage does not discriminate based
on the nationality of the holders of the (otherwise) covered claims or the
currency in which such claims are payable.52 Consistent with the historical
47. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 97–108 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal consequences under
international and English law) and notes 109–122 and accompanying text (analyzing the normative
consequences).
49. Setser, supra note 25, at 4.
50. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4
(2014) [hereinafter Rollover Risk].
51. See Lee C. Buchheit, Luncheon Speech at the Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
organized by the Brevan Howard Centre for Financial Analysis, Imperial College; the Initiative on
Global Markets, University of Chicago Booth School of Business; and the International Insolvency
Institute, held at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel Knightsbridge London (Mar. 27, 2015); cf. Rollover
Risk, supra note 50 (discussing rollover risk as the most likely cause of a possible debt default by
the United States). CACs typically do not apply to short-term sovereign debt (maturity less than one
year) because of perceived restructuring complexities giving the restrictive timing. Only experience
will show whether that presents an insurmountable obstacle.
52. Such discrimination could be problematic, not only motivating foreign creditors “to impose
sanctions (usually trade-related) to punish [the] defaulting government” but also being “interpreted
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norms of most sovereign debt restructuring, however, the Model Law does
not cover a debtor-state’s internal operational debt claims, such as pension
and retiree obligations, tax refunds, unpaid salaries to public employees, or
social program payments. Normally these types of debts are paid in full at a
later time.53
Supervisory Authority. The definition of “Supervisory Authority” in
Article 2(5) of the Model Law references a “neutral international
organization.” This is likely to be one of the Model Law’s most controversial
provisions. Currently, it is unclear what organization might qualify as truly
neutral. Imperfect options might include, among other possibilities, a neutral
committee of the IMF, the World Bank, or the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or even a court of the debtor-
state.54 There are concerns, however, that existing organizations are too
political or conflicted.55
More generally, the very issue of the need for a supervisory authority can
raise confusion. Formal sovereign debt restructuring solutions, such as a
convention, are often conflated with the need for formal supervisory bodies.56
Under the Model Law, however, no formal supervisory authority is needed
to exercise discretion because disputes are adjudicated through binding
arbitration.57 The main role of a Supervisory Authority under the Model Law
as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents
about the [poor] fundamentals of the economy.” Guido Sandleris, Sovereign Defaults: Information,
Investment and Credit, 76 J. OF INT’L ECON. 267, 267, 273 (2008). For example, in the Icesave
dispute, Iceland’s failure to assure protection for foreign creditors led to international litigation and
motivated the United Kingdom to apply anti-terrorist legislation to freeze accounts of Icelandic
citizens in the United Kingdom as retaliation. Jon Danielsson, The First Casualty of the Crisis:
Iceland, in THE FIRSTGLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE 21ST CENTURY PART II 11–12 (Andrew
Felton & Carman Reinhart eds., 2009); Dalvinder Singh, U.K. Approach to Financial Crisis
Management, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 868, 879–80 (2011).
53. See E-mail from Ignacio Tirado, Professor, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, and advisor
to the World Bank, to the author (Mar. 23, 2014) (on file with author).
54. Professor Mooney has proposed that a court of the debtor-state could serve as a supervisory
authority in a sovereign debt restructuring. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Framework for a Formal
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The KISS Principle (Keep it Simple, Stupid) and Other
Guiding Principles, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 57, 101 n.182 (2015).
55. Professor Westbrook argues, for example, that one of the SDRM’s flaws is that the IMF, the
supervisor thereunder, would be conflicted, having responsibility for both funding and
administering the proceeding as well as addressing rights and priorities. Westbrook, supra note 4,
at 256. Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, A Rule of Law for Sovereign Debt, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (June 15, 2015), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sovereign-debt-restruc
turing-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-and-martin-guzman-2015-06 (arguing that the IMF “is too closely
affiliated with creditors” to be neutral).
56. That might in part help to explain U.S. and EU opposition to U.N. efforts to reach a formal
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Appendix, Model Law art. 10; see also Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note
5, at 1023–29.
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is in fact ministerial: to fact-check information, to maintain a list of creditors
and verify claims, and to oversee the creditor voting process.58
Many commentators on sovereign debt restructuring have focused on
supervision of the process and resolution of disputes. Professor Paulus
contends, for example, that there should be a “neutral supervisor” that would
follow procedural rules for restructuring and resolution.59 Others advocate
for the creation of a permanent institutional framework for supervision60 or
argue that existing institutions may serve that purpose.61 And yet others
advocate for a contractually binding arbitration process.62 I believe, however,
58. Cf. Barry Eichengreen, Policy Proposals for Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt,
in THENEWPUBLIC FINANCE 433, 444 (2006) (arguing that a sovereign debt resolution forum need
only engage in ministerial actions).
59. Christoph G. Paulus, A Statutory Procedure for Restructuring Debts of Sovereign States, 6
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALENWIRTSCHAFT 401, 403 (2003).
60. Two senior fellows of CIGI have proposed, for example, the creation of a Sovereign Debt
Forum (SDF), which would be an incorporated non-profit, membership-based organization that
would provide an independent standing body to research and preserve institutional memory on best
practices in sovereign debt restructuring. Richard Gitlin & Brett House, A Blueprint for a Sovereign
Debt Forum 10 (CIGI Paper No. 27, 2014), http://www.cigionline.org/publications/blueprint-
sovereign-debt-forum. The concept of the SDF was borrowed and expanded from “The Sovereign
Debt Forum,” a paper that Richard Gitlin presented in 2002 at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The SDF, they argue, could also serve as a venue to facilitate early engagement among creditors,
debtors, and other stakeholders when sovereign nations encounter financial trouble. Id. at 17.
Professor Howse, in contrast, proposes a debt workout mechanism (DWM) that ensures the
participation of all relevant stakeholders. See generally Robert Howse, Towards a Framework for
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Can Public International Law Contribute?, in TOO LITTLE,
TOO LATE: THEQUEST TORESOLVE SOVEREIGNDEBTCRISES 241 (Martin Guzman et al., 2016).
61. See, e.g., Skylar Brooks & Domenico Lombardi, Governing Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Through Regulatory Standards, J. OF GLOBALIZATION & DEV. (forthcoming) (paper presented at
IPD-CIGI Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring at Columbia University, Sept. 22, 2015).
Brooks and Lombardi argue there is a governance gap for resolving debt crises that can be filled by
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which could serve as the focal institution responsible for
overseeing the coordination and further development of soft law regulatory standards for sovereign
debt restructuring.
62. See generally Francesca Giubilo, Towards a Lasting Solution to Sovereign Debt Problems,
EURODAD (Oct. 4, 2012), http://eurodad.org/1543743/; see also Christoph G. Paulus & Steven T.
Kargman, Reforming the Process of Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Proposal for a Sovereign Debt
Tribunal, (Apr. 7, 2008) (unpublished draft prepared for presentation to the United Nations
Workshop on “Debt, Finance and Emerging Issues in Financial Integration),
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/20080408_Kargman-Paulus-Paper.pdf;
Hugo Ruiz Diaz, The Creation of an Arbitration Tribunal on Debt: An Alternative Solution? On the
Position to Take on the CADTM (June 2003), http://world-governance.org/IMG/pdf_013_Setting_
up_an_arbitration_tribunal_on_debt.pdf. Paulus and Kargman have advocated a “fair and
transparent sovereign debt arbitration process,” also known as sovereign debt tribunals (SDT).
Paulus & Kargman, supra, at 3. Under the SDT process, the decision to subject disputes to an
arbitration panel would be based on contractual agreements between sovereign debtors and their
creditors. Id. at 8. The SDT process also contemplates building trust, confidence, and legitimacy by
selecting a “pool of expert arbitrators” who have knowledge and experience to handle sovereign
debt disputes through a neutral institution. Id. at 5, 8. Cf. Jose Antonio Ocampo, A Brief History of
Sovereign Debt Resolution, and a Proposal for a Multilateral Instrument, in TOO LITTLE, TOO
LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES 189, 200–01 (Martin Guzman et al.,
2016) (proposing an arbitration and mediation approach similar to the WTO dispute mechanisms,
including independent bodies of arbitrators and mediators).
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that if and when an international consensus emerges on the operative legal
solutions needed to solve the holdout and funding problems, the institutional
bodies needed for supervision and resolution will naturally follow.
Debt Sustainability. Article 3(2)(b) of the Model Law requires a debtor-
state’s petition for relief to certify that the debtor-state “needs relief under
this [Model] Law to restructure claims that, absent such relief, would
constitute unsustainable debt of the State.” Although the debtor-state itself
would make the determination of debt sustainability for purposes of Articles
3(2)(b) (and for purposes of Article 6(6)), it should be guided by the best
practices and norms in making such a determination. There does not yet,
however, appear to be a universally accepted view of what constitutes debt
sustainability for nations. Even the IMF framework for conducting debt
sustainability analyses has been criticized for creating inter-creditor
inequities63 and for being ineffective in detecting sustainability problems.64
The Holdout Problem. Article 7 of the Model Law addresses the most
critical problem that a debt-restructuring mechanism can solve—the holdout
problem.65 A Model Law or other statutory approach to sovereign debt
restructuring should be more effective in solving the holdout problem than a
contractual approach.66 Article 7(2), for example, legally mandates
supermajority voting that (assuming the requisite percentages agree) can bind
dissenting classes of claims. This eliminates the need for the contracts
themselves to include CACs.67 Article 7(3) of the Model Law, coupled with
Article 6(1), also enables a debtor-state to use the Model Law to aggregate
creditor voting beyond individual contracts. Aggregate-voting is critical for
at least two reasons: it can prevent creditors of individual sovereign debt
contracts from acting as holdouts vis-a-vis other sovereign debt contracts;68
and it allows a debtor-state to designate large enough classes of claims to
prevent vulture funds (or similar holdouts), as a practical matter, from
63. Skylar Brooks, Martin Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Identifying and
Resolving Inter-Creditor and Debtor-Creditor Equity Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring 3, 4–
5 (CIGI Policy Brief No. 53, Jan. 2015). The implementation of the Model Law should reduce the
need for IMF bailouts, thereby reducing these inter-creditor inequities.
64. See, e.g., Martin Guzman & Daniel Heymann, The IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis: Issues
and Problems, J. OFGLOBALIZATION ANDDEV. 387, 395–97 (2015).
65. Cf. supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (explaining the holdout problem as a type of
collective action problem). It should be emphasized that the Model Law preserves the holdout threat
to the extent needed to motivate debtor-states to bargain fairly, and only seeks to limit that threat
for rent-seeking holdouts who try to unreasonably extract value. See infra notes 120–121 and
accompanying text.
66. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 1003.
67. Although Article 7(2) proposes supermajority percentages that have been used successfully
in U.S. bankruptcy law (see 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2012)), other supermajority percentages could be
substituted. It should be cautioned, however, that the higher the percentages, the easier it would be
(other things being equal) for a vulture fund to buy a blocking position. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text; cf. infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing how the Model Law’s
aggregate-voting can also help to prevent such actions by vulture funds).
68. Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options, supra note 18, at 109.
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purchasing enough claims to block a restructuring plan or otherwise control
the voting.69
In contrast, the Greek sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated that the
CAC approach is insufficient to solve the holdout problem. Even after years
of trying to include them, relatively few Greek debt agreements actually
contained CACs, and those CACs were generally restricted to bond issues.70
Furthermore, most of the CACs that were included in those debt agreements
did not contemplate aggregate-voting and thus did not purport to bind
creditors to supermajority voting beyond the individual bond issue; that
enabled any given bond issue to serve as a holdout vis-a-vis other Greek bond
issues.71 In contrast, statutory supermajority aggregate voting is the tried-
and-true method by which corporate insolvency law successfully, and
equitably, addresses the holdout problem.72
Interim Funding. Chapter IV of the Model Law addresses the critical
need for a financially troubled debtor-state to obtain liquidity during its
restructuring process. Although this funding has, in the past, often been
provided by the IMF, the “IMF’s lending policy . . . is not enough to resolve
the problems posed by debt burdens beyond the country’s ability to pay.”73
Absent the IMF, whose loans have de facto priority, no one would lend new
money without obtaining a priority repayment claim. A contractual solution
would be insufficient; it would be totally impractical to get all existing
creditors to contractually subordinate their claims to the new money.74
A statutory mechanism can help, however, to give such new-money
lenders priority over existing creditors.75 To minimize the risk of
“overinvestment,” existing creditors should have notice and the opportunity
to block the new lending if its amount is too high or its terms are
69. Cf. supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (indicating ICMA’s efforts to introduce
updated forms of CACs that attempt to aggregate voting across debt issues).
70. Recall that the Model Law covers a much broader range of a debtor-state’s debt. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
71. The Statutory Solution, supra note 10; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. See Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority
Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 919
n.116, 940 (1996) (noting that supermajority voting “protects the minority” and that the
“tremendous growth in the size of the corporation as well as the number of shareholders probably
extinguished any thought of returning to the unanimity rules . . . given the obvious potential for
holdout rent seeking”).
73. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 2.
74. The Greek debt restructuring may be an exception to this because “[m]ore than 90 percent
of Greece’s 310 billion euro debt is owed to public institutions: other European governments, the
International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank.” Landon Thomas, A Bold Proposal
to Offer Greece Some Financial Relief, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2015, at B1. Those institutions might
therefore be persuaded, politically, to contractually subordinate their claims to a new-money lender.
75. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 988 (“[G]ranting priority should only
minimally affect ex ante availability and cost of credit . . . because granting priority will not lower
the State’s debt rating, and also because an IMF loan already has de facto priority over other
claims.”). New-money lenders could thereby gain priority over existing creditors whose claims are
governed by English law. See infra Appendix, Model Law ch. IV.
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inappropriate.76 Articles 8(2) and 8(3) of the Model Law, respectively,
provide that notice and opportunity (through reverse supermajority voting77).
Article 8(4) also protects creditors whose claims are governed by the Model
Law (or a similar law) from being outvoted by other creditors of the debtor-
state.78
Recently, the IMF has been considering more flexible options in funding
sovereign nations “in the context of sovereign debt vulnerabilities.”79 When
a troubled member nation seeks financing above its normal IMF-access
limits, the IMF will have to decide whether that nation’s problems can be
resolved with or without a debt restructuring. Under its current policy,
if the [IMF] determines that the member’s debt is sustainable with high
probability, it may provide large scale financing without the need for a debt
restructuring. However, if such a determination cannot be made,
exceptional access may only be provided if a debt restructuring is pursued
that is sufficiently deep to restore sustainability with high probability.80
The IMF is also exploring whether it should have a broader range of
responses. For example, if a member nation is unable to obtain private-sector
funding but its debt is considered (albeit not with high probability)
sustainable without the need for a debt restructuring, the IMF is considering
providing debt relief by extending the maturities of its own debt claims
against that nation.81 In the author’s view, that would effectively constitute a
unilateral debt restructuring—the IMF itself providing a form of debt relief
without seeking a quid pro quo arrangement from the member nation.
Chapter IV of the Model Law also contemplates the possibility of a
debtor-state financing its debt restructuring through the capital markets.
Consistent with best practices in corporate bankruptcy cases, a debtor-state
contemplating invoking application of the Model Law could pre-negotiate
that financing in advance. Nothing in the Model Law prevents a debtor-state
from also, or alternatively, obtaining such financing through a governmental
or multi-governmental source, such as the IMF.
76. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 989–90. Professor Westbrook favors the
transparent public mechanism in the SDRM that would tie budget restructuring to the granting of
new finance. See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 255. That conditionality, however, would be
politically volatile and might impose harsh conditions on the citizens of the debtor-state.
77. Reverse supermajority voting under Article 8(3)—as well as under Article 8(4) (see infra
note 78 and accompanying text)—of the Model Law requires supermajority voting to approve, not
to prevent, the priority.
78. That protection is needed because creditors whose claims are not governed by the Model
Law would likely argue that their claims are not legally subordinated by supermajority voting under
that Law.
79. See IMF, THE FUND’S LENDING FRAMEWORK AND SOVEREIGN DEBT-PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS 1 (June 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/052214.pdf.
80. Id.
81. See id.
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Arbitration of Disputes. The neutral international arbitration body
referenced in Article 10(2) of the Model Law might include a newly created
entity designed to arbitrate sovereign debt-related disputes, such as the free-
standing “Sovereign Debt Tribunal” proposed by Paulus and Kargman.82
Even absent a statutory framework, the resort by sovereign-debt-
restructuring parties to such a tribunal could be contractual. For example,
such parties could agree—ex ante (via contractual agreement in their
underlying loan documents) or ex post (by mutual agreement after the dispute
has arisen)—to arbitrate sovereign debt-related disputes before the tribunal.
Stay of Enforcement Actions. The Model Law omits certain provisions
that one might otherwise associate with a legal framework for sovereign debt
restructuring. For several reasons, it does not propose a stay of enforcement
actions. First, a stay does not appear to be critical in resolving sovereign debt
problems. A debtor-state could unilaterally decide to suspend payments. The
main purpose of a stay, to prevent a grab race, is less significant in a sovereign
debt context because creditors could only attempt to grab the debtor-state’s
relatively few assets located in other jurisdictions.83 Second, model laws are
less likely than conventions to effectively impose enforcement stays. If a
creditor’s claim against a debtor-state is governed by the law of a jurisdiction
that has enacted the Model Law, such creditor would theoretically be
prejudiced in a grab race by other creditors of that state whose claims are
governed by the law of a jurisdiction that has not enacted the Model Law.
That creates perverse incentives for creditors to want to have their claims
governed by the law of a jurisdiction that has not enacted the Model Law.
Third, a stay could be costly, as it may lead to litigation over its scope and
duration and also possibly affect non-bankruptcy incentives, thereby
increasing sovereign financing costs.84
Cram Down. The Model Law also omits a cram-down alternative in the
event one or more classes of claims fail to agree. Although Article 7(1) makes
a debt-restructuring plan effective and binding on the debtor-state and its
creditors when it has been submitted by the debtor-state and agreed to by
each class of such creditors’ claims designated in the plan, any such class of
claims could stymie the plan’s effectiveness by failing to agree. To overcome
the possibility of one or more classes of claims unreasonably withholding
consent to a plan, corporate debt-restructuring laws often provide for a cram-
down power, thereby making a debt-restructuring plan effective and binding
82. See Paulus & Kargman, supra note 62, at 3–4.
83. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 984–85; see also Setser, supra note 25,
at 5 (observing that “[e]ffective legal action by creditors against a sovereign in default is extremely
difficult”), 12 (observing that “neither debtor nor creditor lawyers thought the absence of a formal
stay was much of a problem”) (emphasis in original). But cf. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 444
(arguing that a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring should include hard restraints on
litigation).
84. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 984–85.
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despite the objection of creditors, so long as a court finds the plan to be fair
and equitable.85
Cram down has been applied in at least one governmental debt
restructuring context: the application of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code to municipal debt restructuring. In that context, a municipal debtor can
cram down—or force acceptance of—a debt-restructuring plan over the
objection of one or more dissenting classes of creditors if, under the plan, the
creditors are “receiving all they can reasonably expect to receive under the
circumstances.”86 The application of cram down under Chapter 9 has focused
on whether the municipality has imposed reasonable austerity measures and
has made reasonable use of taxation, so that the plan’s treatment of the
dissenting classes is fair and equitable.87
The difficulties with applying cram down in a governmental debt
restructuring context are in determining what governmental austerity
measures and levels of taxation are reasonable, in order to assess whether the
creditors are receiving all they can reasonably expect under the
circumstances.88 At the very least, these determinations would be complex,
85. The cram-down concept of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for example, requires
the bankruptcy court to confirm a proposed reorganization plan that is, inter alia, “fair and equitable,
with respect to each class of claims,” despite the objection of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)
(2012).
86. More specifically, Chapter 9 allows a court to confirm a proposed municipal bankruptcy
plan, despite creditor objection, if the plan is “in the best interests of the creditors.” Id. § 943(b)(7)
(“The court shall confirm the plan if . . . the plan is in the best interests of the creditors . . . .”). In
making this “best interests” determination, Chapter 9 incorporates the Chapter 11 “fair and
equitable” cram-down test. Id. § 901(a). See also 6 COLLIER ONBANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03[1][f][i][B]
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.); In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 26 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that for a plan to be confirmed as to a dissenting class of creditors, it must
be “fair and equitable” and “not discriminate unfairly”). For the purposes of Chapter 9, fair and
equitable has been held to mean “all [the creditors] can reasonably expect to receive under the
circumstances.” See, e.g., Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942).
87. Cram down’s application must be different, of course, for corporate debtors and
governmental debtors. In Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., the court explained that the
bankruptcy of a public entity is distinguishable from that of a private entity. Newhouse v. Corcoran
Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 717 (1941). In a public
bankruptcy, the entity may not be liquidated with the resulting value applied to its outstanding debts.
Id. at 690–91. Therefore, the expectations of existing creditors must consider that a reorganization
plan needs to account for the continued operation of the debtor. See id. For further discussion of
how the “fair and equitable” cram-down standard works under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code (regarding municipal debtors), and its potential usefulness in a sovereign restructure, see, e.g.,
Zack Clement & R. Andrew Black, How City Finances Can Be Restructured: Learning from Both
Bankruptcy and Contract Impairment Cases, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J. 41, 41–55, 72–84 (2014); see
also Zack Clement, Restructuring Government Finances – In Public and in Less Than a Year, 26
INSOLV. INT. 91 (2013).
88. A possible related concern is that by identifying governmental austerity as a goal, cram down
can inadvertently aggravate a recession. Cf. Arjun Jayadev & Mike Konczal, The Boom Not the
Slump: The Right Time for Austerity (Economics Faculty Publication Series, Paper 26, 2010)
(arguing that fiscal austerity in a period of recession generally aggravates the recession).
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fact-intensive, and highly politically sensitive.89 In the Chapter 9 context,
federal bankruptcy courts make these determinations, yet the decisions are
far from consistent.90 In the sovereign debtor-state context, however, there is
currently no suitable judicial venue for making such determinations.
Furthermore, the standard—are creditors receiving all they can
reasonably expect under the circumstances—is much vaguer in a sovereign
debtor-state context than for domestic U.S. municipalities. In the United
States, there are generally accepted norms about the range of what constitutes
reasonable taxation. Also, the potential flight of residents to other
municipalities—which is much less feasible in a sovereign nation context—
sets pragmatic limits on taxation.
For these reasons, and also because including cram down at this nascent
point in the model-law process could engender significant creditor
opposition,91 the Model Law currently omits a cram-down power. Even
without cram down, the Model Law would still be a major advance, from the
standpoint of debtor-states, over the status quo. If, however, experience with
the Model Law demonstrates that a cram-down power is needed, this Article
is open to its later inclusion.92
Creditors’ Committee. Finally, the Model Law does not provide for the
formal creation of a creditors’ committee to officially represent the debtor-
89. See, e.g., Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 1008–09. Another concern with the
use of cram down for sovereign debtor-states is that expectations regarding taxation and public
operations among creditors may be much more varied than would be expectations in a Chapter 9
case. Compare, for example, the City of Detroit’s recent Chapter 9 case with Argentina’s debt crisis.
Detroit’s creditors are principally U.S. organizations (e.g., pension funds and bond holders). See
Detroit’s 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 19, 2013),
http://archive.freep.com/article/20130719/NEWS01/307190029/detroit-bankruptcy-list-creditors.
By contrast, Argentina’s largest creditors were public and private parties from all over the globe.
Andrew F. Cooper & Bessma Momani, Negotiating Out of Argentina’s Financial Crisis:
Segmenting the International Creditors, 10 NEW POL. ECON. 305, 306 (2005).
90. At least one court has held that a municipality is not required to raise taxes for a plan to be
fair and equitable. In In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., the court held that raising taxes is unnecessary if
it would be futile, and a municipality cannot be required to do so. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233
B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999). By contrast, a plan has been held to not be fair and equitable
where a small increase in tax revenue is possible and sufficient to satisfy creditors. In Fano v.
Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., the appellate court rejected the determination that the plan was
fair and equitable and overturned the lower court’s confirmation because there was not a sufficient
showing that the municipality’s taxing powers were inadequate to generate the revenue needed to
pay the dissenting creditors. Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565–66 (9th
Cir. 1990). But, if an increase in tax revenues would make matters worse for the municipality, then
the plan may be confirmed. In Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., the court held that because increasing
taxes would cause further harm to the debtor, and the best remedy for creditors was fifty-five cents
on the dollar, the plan was fair and equitable. Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 143 F.2d 282, 284
(9th Cir. 1944), cert denied, 323 U.S. 784 (1944) (finding that “55 [cents] on the dollar was the
maximum that the District could reasonably pay on outstanding bonds”).
91. The Model Law should be much easier to “sell” to creditors who—subject to being outvoted
under supermajority aggregate voting—feel they have some control.
92. Cf. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 1009 (suggesting that cram down should
be included in theModel Law if “experience later demonstrates that debtor-States and their creditors
cannot reach consensual agreements without it”).
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state’s creditors in the debt restructuring. An official creditors’ committee
does not appear to be necessary in a sovereign-debt-restructuring context
because “the claims against a State are so large that many creditors, or at least
a de facto committee of creditors chosen consensually, should find it
economically feasible to participate in the restructuring process.”93 Some
have even argued that an official creditors’ committee might be harmful by
promoting “collusive behavior among creditors.”94 Even absent such a
committee, however, the Model Law should help to create what Professor
Paulus calls an “enforced community,”95 by including all of a debtor-state’s
creditors in a resolution proceeding. Creating such a community, he
contends, should promote inter-creditor fairness because all of those
creditors—whether domestic or foreign, private or governmental—are
affected by the debtor-state’s financial condition.96
II. FEASIBILITY
Next, this Article considers the Model Law’s feasibility, beginning with
its legal feasibility, then exploring its economic feasibility, and finally its
political feasibility.
A. LEGAL FEASIBILITY
This Article has implicitly addressed the Model Law’s legal feasibility
throughout. Even given the optional retroactive effect,97 the Model Law’s
principal operative provisions—supermajority aggregate voting and the
granting of priority to financiers of a debtor-state’s debt restructuring—
should not be discriminatory or arbitrary.98 Those provisions should therefore
be enforceable under international law.99
93. Id. at 1002. But cf. Setser, supra note 25, at 7 (describing the refusal of debtor-states to agree
to “pay the expenses of bondholders creditors’ committees” as “a seemingly small demand that
looms surprisingly larger in the list of ‘rights’ [that] creditors wanted” debtor-states to respect).
94. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 3.
95. Paulus, supra note 59, at 402.
96. Id. at 402–03.
97. See infra, Appendix, Model Law art. 1(2).
98. Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1179, 1227–28 (2002); cf. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 1012–13 (analyzing
those same types of retroactive provisions under international law and concluding that none of the
provisions on “super-majority voting, discharge, and the granting of priority to financiers of the
State’s debt restructuring . . . discriminates based on the nationality of the bondholders . . . [or] is
arbitrary because all are essential to a debtor-State’s ability to restructure its debt”).
99. Legal retroactivity is respected under international law so long as it is neither discriminatory
nor arbitrary. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 5, at 1012–13 (citing sources including
LASSAOPPENHEIM&ARTHURWATTS, 1OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONALLAW 918–921 (Sir Robert
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)). The issue of legal risk is related to retroactivity.
Legal risk refers to the risk that substantive provisions of a jurisdiction’s law change after an
agreement is signed incorporating that jurisdiction’s law as its governing law. Legal risk is an
inevitable risk in international agreements. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 25, at 15 (“It is not possible
by contract to stablise the law, eg, that the governing law is that at the time of the contract. The
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The Model Law, including the optional retroactivity, would also be valid
and enforceable under English law if and when enacted by Parliament. The
Sovereignty of Parliament doctrine recognizes Parliament as the supreme
legal authority of the United Kingdom, with authority to create or revoke any
law.100 Absent a formally written constitution, Parliamentary sovereignty
itself is considered “the most important part of the U.K. Constitution.”101 As
a result—at least after Brexit, when any potentially conflicting EU law will
no longer be relevant—even British courts cannot overrule Parliamentary
legislation.102
The only potential post-Brexit complication might be the First Protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been incorporated
into English law.103 Article 1 of that Protocol provides that every person is
“entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions,” raising a question
about the Model Law’s optional retroactivity.104 At least one decision
interpreting the First Protocol suggests that a right to payment, such as a
claim against a debtor-state, is a “possession” thereunder.105Nonetheless, the
First Protocol, by its terms, can be trumped by laws that either deprive a
person of possessions “in the public interest” or “control the use of property
in accordance with the general interest.”106 Retroactivity under the Model
Law should arguably satisfy both tests (although it would only need to satisfy
one) because unsustainable sovereign debt can harm debtor nations, their
citizens, and their creditors, and can also jeopardize the stability of the
financial system.107 Moreover, after Brexit, the First Protocol could be
modified or ended by Parliament acting alone.108
Courts and commentators agree that Parliamentary sovereignty should
logically allow the enactment of retroactive laws. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry,
one of the most renowned justices of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom, has observed that Parliament “can change the legal significance of
fluctuating governing law must still be ascertained and will apply to this term of the contract. A
change in the governing law will override.”).
100. See Parliamentary Sovereignty, U.K. PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/
role/sovereignty/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
101. See id.
102. See, e.g., IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 170 (5th ed. 1959)
(“Parliament can enact legislation dealing with any subject and the legislation of the Parliament is
superior to the jurisdiction of the courts.”); Marek Garlicki, The Doctrine of Parliamentary
Sovereignty after the Lisbon Treaty, GLOBAL POLITICS, http://www.globalpolitics.cz/zamereno-na-
eu/the-doctrine-of-parliamentary-sovereignty-after-the-lisbon-treaty (last visited Oct. 27, 2017)
(stating that “[t]he first implication of Dicey’s definition is that the courts cannot overrule the
legislation of Parliament”).
103. See generally Human Rights Act, 1998 (U.K.).
104. See id. at Part II, art. 1.
105. See Agneessens v. Belgium, 58 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. 83; 19 D. & R. 172 (1988).
106. See Human Rights Act, 1998, Part II, art. 1 (U.K.).
107. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (observing that Parliament has authority to end
any law).
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past events,” including “provid[ing] that something which was lawful when
it was done should be treated as having been unlawful, or conversely, that
what was unlawful at the time should be treated as having been lawful.”109
The old common law presumption against legal retroactivity has been
interpreted as being subject to Parliament’s expressed contrary intention.110
If, therefore, Parliament enacts the Model Law—even including its
option of retroactivity—such Law’s only vulnerability would be changes
thereto or revocations thereof enacted by a future Parliament. That begs the
normative question, though, of why Parliament should want to enact the
Model Law. The answer is that such an enactment would provide significant
social benefit and little harm, and thus should be morally imperative.111
The significant social benefit would be the debt relief that the Model Law
could provide to countries whose unsustainable debt claims are governed by
English law. Recall that a quarter to a third or more of all sovereign debt
contracts appear to be governed by that law.112 Enactment of the Model Law,
especially if retroactive,113 would give those countries the reasonable
opportunity, if needed, to try to renegotiate that debt to sustainable levels.
That, in turn, would reduce economic hardship to innocent citizens and
deprivation of essential government services,114 forestall the likelihood of
riots and other popular protests,115 and reduce the potential for financial chaos
resulting from a country’s debt default.116 There is indeed strong recent
precedent for Parliament enacting law to facilitate sovereign debt relief. In
109. Ben Juratowitch, Foreword, in RETROACTIVITY AND THE COMMON LAW 1 (2008).
110. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [1906] AC 360 (PC) 366 (appeal taken from
Queensl.). These views of English law retroactivity are consistent with the view of Michael Crystal,
Q.C., expressed to the author on June 15, 2015, at an International Insolvency Institute meeting in
Naples, Italy.
111. Cf. SIR LESLIE STEPHEN, THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 145 (1882) (observing that if Parliament
“decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would
be illegal;” but pointing out that “political constitutionalism as opposed to legal constitutionalism”
explains why Parliament does not pass laws ordering the murder of blue-eyed babies: “it is political,
not legal, factors—including, one hopes, legislators’ own sense of morality—that operate as the
restraining force”).
112. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Nick Robins-Early, What’s Behind the Economic Chaos in Venezuela,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2016, 4:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/venezuela-
economic-crisis-explainer_us_57507abde4b0eb20fa0d2c54; Lucy Rodgers & Nassos Stylianou,
How Bad are Things for the People of Greece?, BBC (July 6, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33507802.
115. See, e.g., Niki Kitsantonis & Rachel Donadio,Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After
Riots Rage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/world/europe/greeks
-pessimistic-in-anti-austerity-protests.html.
116. See, e.g., Exec. Comm. on Econ. and Soc. Aff. of the U.N., Finding Solutions to the Debt
Problems of Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ECESA/99/2 (July 1999), http://www.cepal.org/publ
icaciones/xml/6/4306/lcl1230i.pdf; cf. James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship between The Fifth Amendment and The
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 1016 (1983) (explaining the importance of retroactive
bankruptcy legislation).
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the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act,117 Parliament sought to limit the
power of vulture funds and other holdouts from buying developing countries’
sovereign debt at discounted prices and then seeking to recover full payment
through the courts. The Act was originally enacted for a one-year period, to
see if it would have any negative consequences.118 Finding none, the Act was
made permanent on May 16, 2011.119
Enactment of the Model Law would impose little harm. Even if the Law
applies retroactively, the only parties whose expectations would be impaired
would be holdout creditors who oppose being bound by supermajority voting
and demand payment according to their debt contract’s original terms. Any
such impairment, however, would be limited to changes that are voluntarily
agreed to by a supermajority of pari passu creditors120 based on the debtor-
state’s deteriorating economic circumstances, and thus should reflect the
economic reality—and therefore the reasonable expectations—of what those
creditors expect to receive as payment under those changed circumstances.121
Admittedly, those changes might impair a holdout creditor’s ability to
blackmail a country’s debt restructuring, in order to extract value from the
other creditors.122 That holdout behavior, however, would be morally
repugnant—and thus impairing that behavior should not violate the moral
sensibility that operates as the restraining force on members of Parliament.123
In short, enacting the Model Law, even with its option of retroactivity,
should be reasonably necessary and appropriate to further the important
public purpose of enabling countries to restructure their debt to sustainable
levels.124
B. ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY
The economic feasibility of the Model Law will turn on its costs and
benefits, both to debtor-states and to their creditors. Certainly a nation whose
debt has been restructured should be able to borrow at attractive rates. In the
117. See Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act, 2010 (U.K.).
118. See E-mail from Deborah Zandstra, Partner, Clifford Chance, London, to the author (Apr.
21, 2017) (on file with author).
119. See id.
120. See infra, Appendix, Model Law art. 7(3).
121. Cf. Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006) (“To assess whether
an impairment is substantial,” a court should “look at ‘the extent to which reasonable expectations
under the contract have been disrupted.’”) (quoting Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of
New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1997)); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State
‘Bankruptcy’, 59 UCLAL.REV. 322, 336–37 (2011) (advocating for a consensual debt restructuring
process that enables states to seek relief from their unsustainable debt burdens and also protects
creditor expectations—other than those of holdout creditors who are trying to extract value from
others).
122. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
123. See STEPHEN, supra note 111.
124. Cf. HealthNow N.Y. Inc. v N.Y. State Ins. Dept., 973 N.Y.S.2d 387 (N.Y. 2013) (applying
that standard under U.S. constitutional law to determine whether to allow a state law to retroactively
impair contracts).
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non-sovereign context, by analogy, lending rates to restructured companies
are much lower than rates charged before the restructuring.125 But would a
model-law approach increase a nation’s ex ante borrowing costs by making
creditor claims more subject to bail-in?
Leading economists have argued to the contrary—that uncertainty due to
the absence of an effective sovereign debt resolution framework actually
“increases the costs of borrowing.”126 However, even if such a framework
increases costs, overall sovereign borrowing rates should not be affected any
more than if—as most agree would be desirable—workable collective action
aggregate-voting clauses were in fact included in all sovereign debt contracts.
Empirical analysis suggests that the inclusion of those clauses should not
increase (and may even reduce) sovereign borrowing rates.127 That analysis
has since been reinforced by the actual market pricing of sovereign bonds
that include those clauses.128
Furthermore, the possibility that a model-law approach might increase a
nation’s ex ante borrowing costs should be viewed in a larger context. Any
such cost increase should be offset by the cost saving that would result from
a model law. By loose analogy to corporate bankruptcy,129 few economists
would suggest that corporate bankruptcy law—which imposes collection
action aggregate-voting130—should be repealed because it might increase the
borrowing cost of solvent companies.
The economic feasibility of a model-law approach should also take into
account its costs and benefits to creditors. Reduced uncertainty has already
been mentioned as a potential benefit.131 A potential cost, however, is that
the Model Law might appear to facilitate the transfer of value from creditors
125. Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options, supra note 18, at 110–11. This is because creditor
support through participation, combined with operational restructuring that often accompanies debt
restructuring, is viewed favorably by the market. The lower rates also reflect firms’ lower debt-to-
equity ratios. Similarly, a debtor-state should have a lower debt-to-GDP ratio and thus should be
less likely to default in the future. Id.
126. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 1.
127. See Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone, 18 REV.
OF FIN. 2045 (2013) (finding that the presence of CACs is associated with a lower cost of capital,
possibly due to an expectation of faster debt restructuring).
128. The first public offering of sovereign bonds that contained collective action aggregate-voting
clauses, made by Mexico in November 2014, was priced at historically low interest rates. Mark
Sobel, Strengthening Collective Action Clauses: Catalyzing Change—The Back Story, 11 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 1, 10 (2016). The IMF reports that the subsequent inclusion of those clauses in sovereign
debt issues appears to have had no observable impact on pricing. IMF, SECOND PROGRESSREPORT
ON INCLUSION OF ENHANCED CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BOND
CONTRACTS 6 (Dec. 27, 2016) (basing its report on “consultation with selected public debt
managers and market participants (including through two surveys conducted by [IMF] staff in
March and June 2015 of public debt managers)”).
129. The analogy is, at best, loose because there are fundamental differences between
restructuring a corporation’s debt and a sovereign nation’s debt, including that a corporation, unlike
a sovereign, can be liquidated and its assets sold.
130. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2012).
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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to a debtor-state if a class of claims agrees to a restructuring that, for example,
reduces its principal amount or interest rate. Such a transfer of value
nonetheless would be bargained for; each class of claims has the power to
veto the debtor-state’s restructuring plan.132 Moreover, because any such
reduction would reflect the economic reality of what those creditors expect
to be paid in light of the debtor-state’s deteriorating economic
circumstances,133 that deterioration and not the Model Law causes the
transfer of value.134
C. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
This Article has already observed several reasons why a model-law
approach to sovereign debt restructuring should be more politically feasible
than a convention. Most significantly, a model-law approach would not
require general acceptance by the world’s nations for its implementation.135
If English law incorporated the Model Law, a debtor-state whose debt
contracts are governed by English law could realistically be able to
restructure that debt. Experience shows that a model law’s more relaxed
nature can succeed where a formal treaty approach can languish.136
It is also informative to assess the political feasibility of a model-law
approach from the perspective of the politics of the IMF’s failed SDRM. As
mentioned, that approach failed because it was opposed by major financial
industry associations as well as by certain emerging market countries that
feared it would raise their cost of borrowing.137 This Article, specifically Part
II. B, has shown, however, that a model-law approach should not raise, and
may actually reduce, that cost.
A model-law approach should also surmount most other reasons
suggested to explain the SDRM’s failure. At the time the SDRM was
proposed, many believed that “[e]xchange offers, combined with the ability
to amend a bond’s terms[,] provide a mechanism for [sovereign] debt
restructuring even in the absence of a [statutory debt restructuring]
132. See infra, Appendix, Model Law art. 7(1) (providing that a restructuring plan needs the
agreement of each class of claims to become effective and binding).
133. See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
134. Furthermore, any transfer of value from creditors to their debtor-state would be less under
the Model Law than under a typical corporate bankruptcy law, because the latter gives debtors cram-
down powers. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text (discussing that, unlike typical
corporate bankruptcy law, the Model Law does not permit a debtor-state to cram down a plan over
dissenting creditor classes).
135. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. A model-law approach, unlike a treaty, thus
would not face the “profound difficulties [of] building international consensus behind any sweeping
change in global financial regulation.” Setser, supra note 25, at 3.
136. Cf. Setser, supra note 25, at 6 (observing that debtor-states opposed the SDRM because they
were “keen to protect their sovereignty, and to prevent an international organization from gaining
jurisdiction over their domestic-law debt”).
137. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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regime.”138 Experience, however, has undermined that belief.139 Also at that
time, “the major emerging economies—and particularly the Latin American
economies—feared losing access to large scale emergency credit from the
IMF in return for legal protection of only marginal value.”140 The new reality
is that debtor-states cannot always count on the IMF for that credit,141
whereas a model-law approach can give a debtor-state the ability to also
finance its debt restructuring through the capital markets.142
Finally, some have opposed the SDRM because of “[s]uspicions about
the role the IMF would play in a restructuring process designed by the
IMF.”143 This appears to explain, for example, the financial industries’
opposition.144 The model-law approach is not designed by the IMF, nor is the
IMF necessarily part of its supervisory process.145 Others have observed that
some nations may oppose any international tribunal (even one that is
otherwise neutral) interfering with sovereign political discretion.146 Because
this Article’s proposed Model Law limits the supervisory process to mostly
ministerial actions,147 the Supervisory Authority managing that process
would lack authority to interfere with political discretion.
A model-law approach could also provide clear positive political
benefits. By helping to privatize interim funding to a debtor-state,148 it could
reduce the burden on IMF creditor countries of funding IMF bailout loans.149
Reducing the need for IMF funding would also reduce the conditionality that
the IMF, politically, imposes on borrowing nations, which can sometimes
138. Setser, supra note 25, at 5.
139. A Model-Law Approach, supra note 1, at 31.
140. Setser, supra note 25, at 5.
141. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 73 at 1–2 and accompanying text. See also Setser, supra note
25, at 5 (observing that “it is unrealistic for the major emerging economies to think that the IMF
will prevent all default”).
142. See Setser, supra note 25, at 3.
143. Id. at 17.
144. See, e.g., Hagan, supra note 23, at 391–93 (observing that the opposition to the SDRM by
major financial industry associations was attributable to their suspicions regarding IMFmotivation).
Certain emerging market countries, including Turkey, Mexico and Brazil, also opposed the SDRM,
concerned that it would raise interest rates on their sovereign bonds. Setser, supra note 25, at 6, 16.
145. This Article’s proposed Model Law specifies that the Supervisory Authority must be a
“neutral international organization.” Infra, Appendix, Model Law art. 2(5).
146. Cf. Richard Conn, Principal and Managing Dir., Innovate Partners LLC, Keynote Address
at the Gen. Assembly of the U.N., 6th Meeting, 2nd Working Session of the Ad Hoc Comm. on
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes (Apr. 28, 2015) (emphasizing that developed nations are
concerned about international tribunals exercising what should be a nation’s political discretion in
a sovereign debt restructuring).
147. See Eichengreen, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text; see also infra, Appendix, Model Law arts. 8
& 9.
149. Cf. Setser, supra note 25, at 3 (discussing that many IMF creditor countries favored the
SDRM for this same reason).
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exacerbate the nation’s economic woes.150 Furthermore, a model-law
approach could provide a political cover for painful austerity decisions,
which could be attributed by a state to a supervising entity or to legal
requirements.151
None of this means that a model-law approach to sovereign debt
restructuring, or at least this Article’s proposed Model Law, will necessarily
be politically feasible. For example, some debtor-states might oppose the
Model Law’s similar treatment152 of domestic and foreign claims.153 Some
private creditors might also oppose the Model Law’s supermajority
aggregate-voting, believing that the threat of holdouts is necessary to ensure
that debtor-states will bargain fairly154 (but failing to understand that the
Model Law preserves that threat to the extent necessary to motivate fair
bargaining155).
At the very least, however, this Article should serve to increase a model-
law approach’s political feasibility by explaining the approach and its
potential benefits and limitations, including its ability to equitably relieve
debtor-states from unsustainable debt burdens. An incremental approach to
developing norms has strong precedent in the legal ordering of international
relationships,156 especially “where law reformers possess limited authority
and where the subject is either controversial or technical,” such as “global
insolvency law reform.”157
150. See Jayadev & Konczal, supra note 88 at 1; cf. supra note 76 (arguing that the conditionality
that would have been imposed under the IMF’s proposed SDRM would be politically volatile and
might impose harsh conditions on the citizens of the debtor-state).
151. SeeWestbrook, supra note 4, at 256.
152. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
153. Cf. Setser, supra note 25, at 19 (observing that including “domestic debt” claims in the
SDRM “was a bridge too far for almost everyone”).
154. See supra notes 6–7 (and also observing that some creditors believe that the existing
contractual restructuring process is already favorable to debtor-states).
155. See supra note 65. Absent a fair bargain, no creditor class would have an incentive to vote
to approve a debt restructuring plan—and each class has the power to veto the debtor-state’s
restructuring plan. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. The Model Law seeks to eliminate
the holdout threat only for rent-seeking holdouts, who use that threat to unreasonably extract value
(at least in part) from other similarly situated creditors. See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
156. Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 531 (2005) (observing that “states can be gradually led
toward stronger legal rules . . . by starting with relatively weak international rules backed by little
or no sanctions that all states feel comfortable joining, but then gradually pushing states to accept
successively stronger and more challenging requirements”).
157. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, 32 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 851, 852 (2007) (footnotes omitted); cf. Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 36, at
939 (observing that UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency “created an opportunity
to bridge the theoretical gap between universalists and territorialists . . . by appearing to be a hybrid
of universalism and territorialism[,] . . . thus allow[ing] hesitant states to ‘acclimate’ to a regime of
universalism”). An incremental approach to developing norms has also been valuable for addressing
international environmental problems, such as climate change. See, e.g., DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE
NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 221 (2006) (arguing that “an incremental . . . strategy for
2017] Sovereign Debt Restructuring 97
CONCLUSION
Nations sometimes borrow at levels that become unsustainable, often
through no fault of their own. Until resolved, the resulting debt burden hurts
not only those nations (such as Greece) but also their citizens, their creditors,
and—by posing serious systemic risks to the international financial system—
the global economic community.
The existing contractual framework for restructuring sovereign debt is
inadequate, often leaving little alternative between a bailout, which is costly
and creates moral hazard, and a default, which raises the specter of financial
contagion and chaos. Although global organizations, including the United
Nations and the IMF, have tried to strengthen the sovereign-debt-
restructuring framework through treaties, such a multilateral legal approach
is highly unlikely to succeed in the near future.
This Article argues, in contrast, that a model-law approach should
facilitate sovereign debt restructuring much more feasibly than a multilateral
approach. Model laws have long been used in cross-border lawmaking, when
treaties fail. Unlike a treaty, a model law does not require widespread
acceptance for its implementation. In particular, if this Article’s proposed
Model Law were enacted into English law, that alone would enable the fair
and consensual restructuring of the immense stock—perhaps a quarter to a
third or more of all sovereign debt contracts158—of such contracts governed
by that law.159 And because it would achieve, by operation of law, the
equivalent of the ideal goal of including aggregate-voting collective action
clauses in all sovereign debt contracts, such enactment should ensure the
continuing legitimacy and attractiveness of English law as the governing law
for future sovereign debt contracts.
change offers the best alternative for speeding up the transition to a new environmental regulation .
. .”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21,
133–34 (2001) (observing that “any solution to current concerns with the U.S. environmental
regulatory system is likely to be and is best served by an incremental approach . . .”); Philippa
England, Book Reviews, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1037, 1038 (2005) (reviewing International
Encyclopaedia of Laws, Supplement 46, in FRANCIS BOTCHWAY, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIAOF LAWS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004)) (“More sophisticated legal techniques
are not necessarily the solution—realistic, feasible solutions driven by the political will of leaders,
the general population and supported by the international community may offer a more incremental
but ultimately more effective method of dealing with environmental issues.”). And recently, an
incremental approach to developing norms has succeeded in legalizing gay marriage. SeeObergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
158. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
159. The Model Law’s application to existing sovereign debt contracts governed by English law
assumes such Law’s enactment includes the option of retroactivity. See supra notes 46–47 and
accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
[suggested text for a]
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGMODEL
LAW
PREAMBLE
The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for
restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt so as to reduce (a) the social
costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk to the financial system, (c)
creditor uncertainty, and (d) the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are
costly and create moral hazard.
CHAPTER I: SCOPE, AND USE OF TERMS
ARTICLE 1: SCOPE
(1) This Law applies where, by contract or otherwise, (a) the law of [this
jurisdiction160] governs the debtor-creditor relationship between a State and
its creditors, and (b) the application of this Law is invoked in accordance
with Chapter II.
(2) Where this Law applies, it shall [operate retroactively161 and, without
limiting the foregoing, shall] override any contractual provisions that are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Law.
ARTICLE 2: USE OF TERMS
For purposes of this Law:
(1) ‘creditor’ means a person or entity that has a claim against a State;
(2) ‘claim’ means a payment claim against a State for monies borrowed or
for the State’s guarantee of, or other contingent obligation on, monies
borrowed; and the term “monies borrowed” shall include the following,
whether or not it represents the borrowing of money per se: monies owing
under bonds, debentures, notes, or similar instruments; monies owing for
the deferred purchase price of property or services, other than trade accounts
160. This refers to a jurisdiction that enacts a law in the form of the Model Law—in this Article’s
specific case, English law. Articles 3(3) and 11 further expand the Model Law’s application.
161. This optional retroactive application would enable the Model Law to also resolve problems
of unsustainable sovereign debt that arise under existing debt contracts. See supra notes 46–47 and
accompanying text.
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payable arising in the ordinary course of business; monies owing on
capitalized lease obligations; monies owing on or with respect to letters of
credit, bankers’ acceptances, or other extensions of credit; and monies
owing on money-market instruments or instruments used to finance trade;
(3) ‘Plan’ means a debt restructuring plan contemplated by Chapter III;
(4) ‘State’ means a sovereign nation;
(5) ‘Supervisory Authority’ means [name of neutral international
organization].
CHAPTER II: INVOKING THE LAW’S APPLICATION
ARTICLE 3: PETITION FORRELIEF, ANDRECOGNITION
(1) A State may invoke application of this Law by filing a voluntary petition
for relief with the Supervisory Authority.
(2) Such petition shall certify that the State (a) seeks relief under this Law,
and has not previously sought relief under this Law (or under any other law
that is substantially in the form of this Law) during the past [ten162] years,
(b) needs relief under this Law to restructure claims that, absent such relief,
would constitute unsustainable debt of the State, (c) agrees to restructure
those claims in accordance with this Law, (d) agrees to all other terms,
conditions, and provisions of this Law, and (e) has duly enacted any national
law needed to effectuate these agreements. If requested by the Supervisory
Authority, such petition shall also attach documents and legal opinions
evidencing compliance with clause (e).
(3) Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so long
as such filing has not been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority [or this
jurisdiction] for lack of good faith,163 the terms, conditions, and provisions
of this Law shall (a) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the
State and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed by the law
of [this jurisdiction]; (b) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between
the State and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed by the
law of another jurisdiction that has enacted law substantially in the form of
this Law; and (c) be recognized in, and by, all other jurisdictions that have
enacted law substantially in the form of this Law.
162. The reason for inserting a time limit is to deter a debtor-state’s abuse of the Model Law’s
provisions.
163. Lack of good faith might include, for example, a certification of “unsustainable debt” under
Article 3(2)(b) that manifestly violates best practices or norms for determining what constitutes
unsustainable debt. Cf. supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (indicating that this does not yet
appear to be a universally accepted view of what constitutes debt sustainability for nations).
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ARTICLE 4: NOTIFICATION OFCREDITORS
(1) Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the State shall notify all
of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a Plan under this Law.
(2) The Supervisory Authority shall prepare and maintain a current list of
creditors of the State and verify claims for purposes of supervising voting
under this Law.
CHAPTER III: VOTING ON A DEBT RESTRUCTURING PLAN
ARTICLE 5: SUBMISSION OF PLAN
(1) The State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, and may submit
alternative Plans from time to time.
(2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan.
ARTICLE 6: CONTENTS OF PLAN
A Plan shall
(1) designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3);
(2) specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims;
(3) provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class, unless
the holder of a claim agrees to a less favourable treatment;
(4) disclose any claims not included in the Plan’s classes of claims;164
(5) provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation including, with
respect to any claims, curing or waiving any defaults or changing the
maturity dates, principal amount, interest rate, or other terms or cancelling
or modifying any liens or encumbrances; and
(6) certify that, if the Plan becomes effective and binding on the State and
its creditors under Article 7(1), the State’s debt will become sustainable.165
ARTICLE 7: VOTING ON THE PLAN
(1) A Plan shall become effective and binding on the State and its creditors
when it has been submitted by the State and agreed to by each class of such
creditors’ claims designated in the Plan under Article 6(1). Thereupon, the
164. Depending on the contractual terms, a debtor-state could, for example, decide to exclude
claims that incorporate collective action aggregate-voting clauses from the Plan’s classes of claims
and deal with those claims separately. The debtor-state then would be required to disclose those
excluded claims.
165. Because the debtor-state itself makes the determination of debt sustainability, such
determination could take into account whatever criteria the debtor-state deems relevant, including
economic policy measures adopted by the debtor-state to help ensure the future payment of its debt.
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State shall be discharged from all claims included in those classes of claims,
except as provided in the Plan.
(2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least [two-
thirds] in principal amount and more than [one-half] in number of the claims
of such class [voting on such Plan166] [entitled to vote on such Plan] agree
to the Plan.
(3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the State that are pari
passu in priority, provided that (a) pari passu claims need not all be included
in the same class,167 (b) claims of governmental or multi-governmental
entities each shall be classed separately,168 and (c) claims that are governed
by this Law or by the law of another jurisdiction that is substantially in the
form of this Law shall not be classed with other claims.169
CHAPTER IV: FINANCING THE RESTRUCTURING
ARTICLE 8: TERMS OF LENDING
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article 8, the State shall have the right
to borrow money on such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate.
(2) The State shall notify all of its known creditors of its intention to borrow
under Article 8(1), the terms and conditions of the borrowing, and the
proposed use of the loan proceeds. Such notice shall also direct those
creditors to respond to the Supervisory Authority within 30 days, stating (a)
whether they approve or disapprove of such loan, (b) the principal amount
of their claims against the State, and (c) the principal amount of those claims
that are governed by this Law or by the law of another jurisdiction that is
substantially in the form of this Law.
(3) Any such loan must be approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds
in principal amount of the claims of creditors responding to the Supervisory
Authority within that 30-day period.
(4) In order for the priority of repayment (and corresponding subordination)
under Article 9 to be effective, any such loan must additionally be approved
by creditors holding at least two-thirds in principal amount of the “covered”
claims of creditors responding to the Supervisory Authority within that 30-
day period. Claims shall be deemed to be “covered” if they are governed by
166. The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but reliable notice to
creditors then becomes more important.
167. The Plan can, for example, designate one or more classes of pari passu creditors from
multiple debt issues.
168. This separate classification should apply only for entities that vote in good faith.
169. Article 7(3)(c) prevents creditors whose claims are governed by the Model Law (or a similar
law) from being outvoted by other creditors of the debtor-state. Cf. infra note 170 and accompanying
text (showing how separate voting protects those creditors from becoming unfairly subordinated to
new-money financing).
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this Law or by the law of another jurisdiction that is substantially in the
form of this Law.170
ARTICLE 9: PRIORITY OFREPAYMENT
(1) The State shall repay loans approved under Article 8 prior to paying any
other claims.
(2) The claims of creditors of the State are subordinated to the extent needed
to effectuate the priority payment under this Article 9. Such claims are not
subordinated for any other purpose.
(3) The priority of repayment (and corresponding subordination) under this
Article 9 is expressly subject to the approval by creditors under Article 8(4).
CHAPTER V: ADJUDICATION OF DISPUTES
ARTICLE 10: ARBITRATION
(1) All disputes arising under this Law shall be resolved by binding
arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators.
(2) The arbitration shall be governed by [generally accepted international
arbitration rules of (name of neutral international arbitration body)] [the
rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)/ International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)/ International Centre
for Dispute Resolution/ ICC International Court of Arbitration].
(3) Notwithstanding Article 10(2), if all the parties to an arbitration
contractually agree that such arbitration shall be governed by other rules, it
shall be so governed. Such agreement may be made before or after the
dispute arises.
(4) The State shall pay all costs, fees, and expenses of the arbitrations.171
CHAPTER VI: OPT IN
ARTICLE 11: OPTING IN TO THIS LAW
(1) Any creditors of the State whose claims are not otherwise governed by
this Law may contractually opt in to this Law’s terms, conditions, and
provisions.
170. Article 8(4) protects creditors whose claims are governed by the Model Law (or a similar
law) from being outvoted by other creditors of the debtor-state. See supra note 78 and accompanying
text; cf. supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing how separate Plan classification protects
those creditors from becoming unfairly outvoted).
171. This is consistent with best practices in a corporate bankruptcy case, under which the estate
normally pays all costs. Alternatively, the Model Law could provide that the parties to the dispute
should pay their own expenses.
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(2) The terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law shall apply to the
debtor-creditor relationship between the State and creditors opting in under
Article 11(1) as if such relationship were governed by the law of [this
jurisdiction] under Article 3(3).
